In response to an article by de Gruijter and Hambleton (1984) , some thoughts on the use of decision theory for setting cutoff scores on mastery tests are presented. This paper argues that decision theory offers much more than suggested by de (see, however, Hambleton, 1978; Popham, 1978) , statistical decision theory has been adopted as the basic paradigm in mastery testing research. In view of this, de Gruijter and Hambleton's (1984) paper is a timely and welcome attempt at evaluating the progress being made in this area. The paper, however, strikes the reader by the fact that, despite a basic trust in the potential of decision theory for
In response to an article by de Gruijter and Hambleton (1984) , some thoughts on the use of decision theory for setting cutoff scores on mastery tests are presented. This paper argues that decision theory offers much more than suggested by de Gruijter and Hambleton and that an attempt at evaluating its potentials for mastery testing should address the full scale of possibilities. As for the problems de generally, is in uniform accuracy of the instrument along some part of the scale, whereas in decision making this is seldom a prerequisite.
A favorable exception to this somewhat onesided interest is found in the mastery testing literature. For the most part, this is due to a seminal paper by Hambleton and Novick (1973) . In their paper, one of the three '6~lassi~s9' in the history of criterion-referenced measurement (van der Lin- den, 9 1982a), the authors proposed the use of (Bayesian) decision theory to optimize and analyze cutoff scores on mastery tests. The proposal has stimulated others to work out decision-theoretic solutions as well, and a great variety of versatile contributions have followed. Currently, notwithstanding Glass's (1978) critical comments (see, however, Hambleton, 1978; Popham, 1978) , statistical decision theory has been adopted as the basic paradigm in mastery testing research. In view of this, de Gruijter and Hambleton's (1984) Huynh, 1980; Veldhuizen, 1982 The point to be noted, however, is that the necessity to distinguish subpopulations arises from the mastery testing problem and its educational or societal context and not from the application of decision theory. Any other method of standard setting will meet the same problem as it arises.
The distinction between possible subpopulations was made first in testing for selection. There the fact that test items may be biased against minority groups led to societal protests and created the problem of culture-fair selection. As Gross and Su (1975) and Petersen and Novick (1976) have argued convincingly, fair selection is a question of utilities.
A selection procedure is 'fair&dquo; if the utility structure underlying its selection rule reflects the utilities of those involved in the selection process (see also Mellenbergh & van der 
